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1 Introduction
Contracts have long been studied as a means of making commitments, establishing payments,
and allocating decision and control rights to promote more efficient exchange. Most contracts,
however, tend to be remarkably simple and frequently omit potentially useful and feasible
provisions.1 Many reasons why economic actors may write such incomplete contracts have
been proposed in the literature, including direct costs of contracting, non-verifiability of
outcomes, and unforeseen outcomes (see Hart 1995 and Tirole 1999 for surveys).
We propose a new reason why incomplete contracts may be so prevalent. We argue
the unenforceable components of a contract (“handshake agreements”) establish norms that
are endogenous and local to a relationship (“induced norms”)2 that agents feel beholden to
follow.3 Making a handshake agreement to take the first best action leads individuals to take
more efficient and prosocial actions, despite the absence of legal enforcement of the promise.
Consequently, handshake agreements may substitute for (costly) enforceable restrictions and
may be particularly useful when verifiability or other limitations prevent writing a more
complete contract.4
To identify the role of handshake agreements on behavior, we conduct a laboratory ex-
periment in which subjects make simple contracts before playing one of four games. The
contracts consist of either (a) an enforceable minimum action (“Minimum contract”), (b) an
unenforceable handshake agreement to play the first best action (“Handshake contract”), or
1Macauley (1963) is a seminal paper documenting the under-specification of many manufacturing contracts;
similarly, Carlton (1986) suggests that for many industrial transactions the “contracts specify neither price
nor quantity.” See also Lyons (1996) for a survey. Employment contracts often specify only hours, duration,
and compensation. Service contracts are often similarly simple (e.g. hourly rate or fixed price contracts)
and, generally, neither specify particular behaviors nor make provisions contingent on potentially verifiable
information (see Eggleston et al. 2000).
2Induced norms are distinct from (and act in addition to) personal prosocial inclinations (e.g. altruism)
and general norms (e.g. fairness) that are present across many environments. Induced norms are created by
the agreement between individuals.
3Our conception of induced norms, which are established in the contracting stage of a relationship, differs
significantly from the way other papers have suggested contracts and norms interact. Sliwka (2007) argues
that an employer’s unilateral contract choice signals her belief about which behavioral norm applies for her
employees. Hart and Moore (2008) argues that contracts set reference points and that individuals will provide
less effort when outcomes differ from these reference points (see also Fehr et al. 2009 for an experimental
demonstration). It also shares some commonalities with the organizational behavior literature on psychological
contracts—the often implicit set of expectations and obligations that develop from a contract and/or working
relationships (see Rousseau 1989, for a seminal paper in this literature, as well as Morrison and Robinson
1997, on psychological contract violation and Rousseau and Parks 1992, who contrast psychological contracts
with other forms of contracts).
4Parties can always create an unenforceable handshake agreement to take the first best action. For example,
even if the specific first best action is not known ex ante, the parties can agree to take the first best action
when it becomes known.
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(c) both a minimum and an unenforceable handshake agreement (“Combined contract”). The
Handshake contract substantially increases actions towards the first best in all of our games.
Furthermore, the optimal contract always includes a Handshake agreement, and often adding
an enforceable minimum to a handshake agreement provides little additional benefit.
We also consider whether enforceable restrictions and incentives have a detrimental effects
on prosocial motivation in our context, as has been shown to be the case in principal-agent
settings. Requesting a contract with a minimum could be insulting or signal a lack of trust-
worthiness, suggesting that the Handshake contract could outperform the Combined contract
in our setting.5 However, the Handshake contract performs strictly better than the Combined
contract in only one of our four games (the Bertrand game). This result suggests that control
mechanisms may not undermine prosocial motivations in a setting like ours with bilateral
actions and symmetric contractual restrictions.
While norms can be induced explicitly in a contract,6 as in our experiment, we believe
they can also be created verbally through writing the contract as each party states their
commitments and expectations. Similarly, company mottos or credos, which are the basis for
corporate culture, might work to establish a norm across an entire organization.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the design of our experiment;
Section 3 describes our experimental predictions; Section 4 reports and analyzes the results
of our experiment; Section 5 interprets and discusses the implications of our results and how
our findings fit into related literatures; and Section 6 summarizes our major conclusions.
2 Experimental Design
In the experiment, subjects make simple contracts before choosing actions in games in which
higher actions are personally costly but socially beneficial. All games are symmetric, two-
person, one-shot, simultaneous-move games in which both subjects face the same incentives
and choose actions simultaneously. Subjects play with either symmetric contracting rules
(where any contract must be mutually agreed upon) or unilateral contracting rules (where
one individual is randomly selected to set the contract).7
5Both the “hidden costs” (e.g. Falk and Kosfeld 2006) and “crowding out” (e.g. Gneezy and Rusti-
chini 2000) literatures demonstrate that enforceable control and incentive mechanisms can be detrimental to
efficiency; these literatures are discussed further in Section 5.
6For an example of a contract explicitly creating a norm see the Partner’s Agreement of Accenture LTD
(http://contracts.onecle.com/accenture/partners.pma.2001.04.18.shtml) where the specification of the part-
ners’ duties and obligations are almost entirely described in terms of principles such as “stewardship” and
“subordination of personal interests.”
7Environments in which two agents mutually set the norms for a relationship and have symmetric obliga-
tions within the relationship, as under the symmetric contracting rule, encompass many workplace settings
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2.1 Round Structure
Each round had the following structure (for all games):
1. Subjects are randomly matched with a new, anonymous partner.
2. One subject (under the unilateral rule) or both subjects (under the symmetric rule) ask
for or decline each of the three contracts, one at a time.
3. One contracting environment is selected randomly, and the contract is imposed if the
chosen subject (under unilateral) or both subjects (under symmetric) asked for it.
4. Subjects make action choices for the stage game.
5. Subjects guess the action of their partner.
6. Action choices and payoffs are revealed.
2.2 The Stage Games
We examined four different games: an Additive Public Good Game (APG), a Multiplicative
Public Good Game (MPG), a Double Dictator Game (DDG), and a Bertrand Game (BG).8
The MPG and the BG are games with strategic complements (an individual’s monetary best
response is increasing in the action of the other player), while the APG and the DDG have
strategic independence (an individual’s monetary best response does not depend on the action
of the other player). The payoffs for the games were as follows:
Additive Public Goods Game (APG): pii(xi, xj) = 10(xi + xj)− x
2
i − 50
Multiplicative Public Goods Game (MPG) : pii(xi, xj) = 3(xi ∗ xj)− 2x
2
i + 25
Double Dictator Game (DDG): pii(xi, xj) = 20− 2xi + 6xj




if xi = xj
pii(xi, xj) = 0 if xi > xj
as well as joint projects and cooperative agreements. By also studying environments in which one agent
unilaterally determines the contract, we are able to to investigate whether the symmetry of the contracting
environment is necessary for the beneficial effects of the contracts. Variation in the contracting rules also
allows us to speak to the “hidden cost” literature (i.e. Falk and Kosfeld 2006) by examining settings in which
one agent places unilateral restrictions on the relationship. Our setting remains distinct from Falk and Kosfeld
(2006) as we only examine relationships where two parties both take actions and have symmetric payoffs.
8Public goods games have been used extensively to study the effect of preplay communication (e.g. Dawes
at al. 1977). The Bertrand Game was used previously in Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) and Dufwenberg et
al. (2007) to study competitive structures such as minimum price floors.
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For all of the games, the selfish best response is at (or near) the minimum action in the
action space and the first best action is at (or near) the maximum action in the action space.
Consequently, higher actions are more costly but more socially beneficial. In particular, in
the APG, subjects could choose any (integer) action between 4 and 11: the selfish equilibrium
action is 5 and the first best action is 10. For the MPG, subjects could choose any (integer)
action between 0 and 6: the selfish equilibrium is 0 and the first best action is 6. For the
DDG, subjects could choose any (integer) action between 0 and 10: the selfish equilibrium
is 0 and the first best action is 10. For the BG, subjects could choose any (integer) action
between 0 and 100: the selfish equilibria are 0, 1, and 2 and the first best action is 100.
Subjects played 10 rounds each of two different games. They played either the APG and
the MPG or the DDG and the BG.9 For each pair of games, the order of the games was
randomized across sessions. Subjects were randomly and anonymously paired with a new
subject in each period, and they never played with the same subject more than once for each
game. For all games in all sessions, each experimental unit was worth $0.15. One period from
each of the two games was selected randomly for payment at the end of the experiment.10
Since quadratic action costs might have been difficult for subjects to calculate, a payoff table
(showing the payoff from every pair of actions) was displayed on every screen for both the
APG and MPG.
2.3 The Contracting Phase
Subjects were informed that each round, before the stage game, one of four contracting
environments would be randomly selected. In one environment no contract was allowed
(“No Contract”). In the three other environments, subjects could have a Minimum contract
(labeled a “restriction” in the instructions), a Handshake contract (called an “agreement” in
the instructions), or a Combined contract (which had both a restriction and an agreement).11
Before subjects knew which contracting environment had been randomly selected, subjects
9Subjects played these two pairs of games because our experiment occurred in waves over the course of
several months. For each wave we wanted subjects to play both a game with strategic independence and a
game strategic complements. We selected the DDG and BG games for the second, third and fourth waves
both because they have simpler payoff functions than the APG and MPG and to look at a game (the BG)
with stronger strategic complements than the MPG.
10We chose to pay one of each set of ten periods so that we could increase the nominal size of the payoffs
in each period without making the overall subject payment too large.
11Several experiments have considered a form of preplay communication that is related to our “handshake
agreements,”allowing subjects to promise what action they will take (see Charness and Dufwenberg 2006 and
Vanberg 2008, as well as Sally 1995 for an early meta-analysis of prisoner’s dilemma games). Our paper
differs from the previous literature in three important ways. We consider this communication in the context
of contracting, we demonstrate that the effect of promises can be modeled as one of norm formation, and we
directly compare unenforceable communication to enforceable contracts.
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asked for (“suggested”) or declined each of the three potential contracts, one at a time.
Because the contracting environment was randomly selected, these contracting choices did
not affect what contract was available that period, only whether the available contract was
implemented. Under the symmetric contracting rule, both subjects had to ask for a contract
for it to be implemented when its contracting environment was randomly selected. Under
the unilateral contracting rule, one subject was randomly chosen to determine the contract
in each round and that subject had to ask for the contract for it to be implemented when its
contracting environment was randomly selected.
We had subjects ask for or decline each of the three contracts in every round so we could
rule out the possibility that our experimental results were driven by selection. In particular,
we wanted to eliminate the alternative hypothesis that only inherently prosocial subjects
wanted handshake contracts and thus handshake contracts were associated with higher actions
due to selection rather than treatment. Because we observe all the contracting choices, we
can compare subjects with the same contracting preferences (eliminating selection) but who
faced different contracting environments (the treatment). We generally focus on subjects
who requested all three contracts in a given round and thus received a particular contract
randomly.12 After the subjects made their choice for each kind of contract, one of the three
contracts (or no contract) was randomly selected to be available in that period. The random
sequences were constructed so that over the 10 periods the No Contract andMinimum contract
environments would be selected twice and the Handshake contract and Combined contract
environments would be selected three times, in random order.
The content of the three contracts were fixed exogenously and were described by the
clauses in quotes below. For each game, X was an integer that was the minimum action
allowed under the enforceable restriction, which was the same for the Minimum contract and
the Combined contract, and was held constant throughout each game (X was selected to be
a fairly weak restriction). For each game, Y was the integer of the first best (i.e. socially
optimal) action.13
12For such a subject (who had requested all three contracts) to appear in the data and be playing under a
particular contract, it only required that the contract was randomly selected to be available for that period
and (under the symmetric contracting rule) the randomly selected partner to have suggested that contract.
To appear in the data playing under the no contracting environment all that was required was that the no
contract environment was randomly selected that period.
13We look at exogenously determined contract terms to cleanly focus on the content of the contracts and to
control for selection issues. Because we wanted to compare subjects who made the same contracting choice,
but were randomly placed in different contracting environments, we limited the number of potential contracts
so that there would be a large enough set of subjects who made the same choice and so that there would be
enough observations within each contract. Allowing subjects to choose contractual terms endogenously is an
interesting direction of future research that we intend to pursue.
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• Minimum contract: “We must each choose an action of at least X”
• Handshake contract: “We agree to each take action Y”
• Combined contract: “We must each choose an action of at least X, and we agree to
each take action Y”
For the APG, X was 6 and Y was 10. For the MPG, X was 2 and Y was 6. In the baseline
analysis of the DDG, X was 1 and Y was 10. In the baseline analysis of the the BG, X was 10
and Y was 100. For the latter two games, we also ran additional sessions under the symmetric
contracting rule with a higher minimum action (X was 3 in the DDG and X was 30 in the
BG) to directly test the effect of different minimum actions (i.e. levels of enforceability) on
behavior.
After asking for or declining each contract, subjects were informed of which contracting
environment had been randomly selected by the computer and whether the contract for that
environment was in effect.14 Subjects then selected their action for the game (restricted by
the minimum if it was enacted) and guessed what action their partner would take (subjects
earned $0.25 for each correct guess).15 Finally, subjects were reminded of their own action,
informed of their partner’s action, and informed of both their earnings and their partner’s
earnings for the round.
3 Behavioral Predictions
In this section we sketch a simple framework to help motivate our predictions.16
To capture our intuition that norms influence the actions subjects take, we assume that,
in addition to standard utility from monetary payoffs, an individual receives disutility to the
extent that her action xi deviates from a norm xˆ. This generates a utility function:
Ui(xi, xj ; xˆ) = pii(xi, xj)− φig(xˆ− xi) if xi < xˆ
Ui(xi, xj ; xˆ) = pii(xi, xj) otherwise
14Subjects were also reminded of their own contracting choice and, under the symmetric contracting rule,
told whether their partner had also asked for the contract.
15We elicit subject beliefs so that we can distinguish between strategically motivated effects of the handshake
(particularly in the MPG and BG, which have strategic complements) from direct effects of the handshake
on behavior (i.e. concern for following the norm independent of beliefs about partner’s action).
16While we present only a brief sketch of a model here, we solve a full model in an earlier version of this
paper (Kessler and Leider, 2009). Lo´pez-Pe´rez (2008) also considers a general model of social norms that
has some features in common with our framework (although it does not consider contracting or handshake
agreements).
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where g is an increasing function that denotes the disutility from deviating from the norm
and φi indicates individual i’s level of norm-sensitivity (relative to pecuniary motivations).
An individual with φ = 0 is a standard selfish individual who does not incur disutility from
deviating from the norm, while as φ→∞ an individual becomes perfectly norm-fulfilling.
Our motivating intuition is that the contract the two agents choose establishes an induced
norm, xˆH, that sets xˆ for the relationship.
17
Hypothesis 1 The mean action taken under each contract with a handshake agreement (the
Handshake contract and Combined contract) will be higher than the mean action taken under
the corresponding contract without a handshake agreement (the No Contract and the Minimum
contract, respectively).
Given our behavioral assumptions, it is straightforward to see that as long as there are
some norm-sensitive individuals (with φ > 0), the average action taken by subjects in our
experiment should be higher when the norm is higher. In all the games, individuals have a
material incentive to take a relatively low action (either the minimum action possible in the
games with strategic independence, or an action lower than the other agent in the games with
strategic complements). When the agent is norm sensitive, and therefore receives disutility
for taking an action below the norm, he has a countervailing incentive to take a higher action
(in order to reduce this disutility). When the norm increases, players increase their action to
reduce the disutility from violating the norm.18
In our experiment, the contracts with the handshake agreement require subjects to agree
to take the first best action. We therefore argue that making a handshake agreement creates
an induced norm to take the first best action. Consequently, whenever subjects have a hand-
shake agreement, they should take higher actions than the corresponding contract without a
handshake agreement. This is the cleanest and most basic prediction of our intuition because
we hold constant the presence or absence of an enforced minimum action. Depending on
17We do not rule out the existence of a preexisting “background norm” that might encourage subjects to
take a higher action than they would if only selfish motives were at play. In this case, we argue that when
the contract includes a handshake agreement (i.e. the Handshake contract and the Combined contract) the
resulting induced norm, xˆH, is higher than any preexisting background norm xˆ0 that might exist when there
is no handshake agreement: xˆH > xˆ0.
18The exact actions individuals take will depend on the form of the utility function U . In general, if U is
concave (e.g. if pi is linear and g is convex, or if pi is concave and g is linear), solutions will be interior (i.e.
individuals will take an action between the selfish optimum and the norm), while if U is linear or convex,
solutions will be bang-bang (i.e. individuals will take either the selfish action or the normative action). We
expect average actions to increase when the norm increases either because many individuals increase their
actions slightly (if the optimal action is interior) or because a few individuals change their action to the norm
(if the optimal action is bang-bang).
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the functional form of the material payoffs and the disutility from violating the norm, the
response to a handshake agreement can either be a bang-bang response (subjects either play
the first best or play the selfish action) or can be a partial response (subjects take an action
between the first best and the selfish action).
Hypothesis 2 The effect of the handshake agreement will be larger in the games with strategic
complements: the Multiplicative Public Good Game (MPG) and the Bertrand Game (BG).
In games with strategic independence, only subjects who are norm sensitive should respond
to a handshake agreement. A selfish subject only cares about his monetary payoffs and his
incentives do not depend on the action of his partner. In games with strategic complements,
however, a selfish subject has a material incentive to increase his action under a handshake
agreement if he believes his partner is norm sensitive and will also increase his action. For
example, if a selfish subject in the Bertrand Game believes a handshake agreement will
increase his partner’s action from 20 to 60, then his best response increases from 19 to 59.
Therefore, we expect the handshake agreement to have the greatest effect in the games with
strategic complements, the MPG and the BG.
Hypothesis 3 An enforceable minimum will only affect the subjects for whom it binds, so
adding an enforceable minimum will be particularly useful when actions under No Contract
are particularly low.
The enforceable minimum should have its greatest effect on subjects who would otherwise
take an action below the minimum. Therefore, the Minimum contract should have its largest
effect when the average action under No Contract is low.19 Similarly, the Combined contract
will have a larger effect than the Handshake contract in games where there are still many
subjects choosing low actions under the Handshake contract. This hypothesis additionally as-
sumes that adding the enforceable minimum will not impact the strength of the induced norm
set by the handshake agreement of the contract. We find mixed evidence of this assumption
and discuss it further in Section 5.
4 Experimental Results
Sessions were run at the Computer Lab for Experimental Research (CLER) at Harvard Busi-
ness School using its standard subject pool. The experiment was programmed and conducted
19We expect low actions under no contract when general prosocial inclinations or preexisting background
norms are weak. Games and decision contexts will likely differ in the norm that exists absent a specific
agreement and in the distribution of individuals’ willingness to follow the norm. Therefore, the minimum
should be most important in settings where xˆ (without a handshake) is low and/or where φi is low.
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with z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). 78 subjects participated in the first wave of sessions, playing
the Additive Public Good (APG) and Multiplicative Public Good (MPG) games under the
symmetric contracting rule. 102 subjects participated in the second wave of sessions, playing
the Double Dictator Game (DDG) and the Bertrand Game (BG) with the very low minimum
actions (i.e. weak enforceable restrictions) under the symmetric contracting rule. 70 subjects
participated in the third wave of sessions, playing the DDG and BG with higher minimum
actions under the symmetric contracting rule. Finally, 62 subjects participated in the fourth
wave of sessions, playing the DDG and BG with the very low minimum actions under the
unilateral contracting rule. Subjects earned on average approximately $20 in all waves, and
all sessions lasted less than one hour.
We first analyze the first two waves of sessions, in which subjects played two of the four
games under the weak enforceable restrictions. Unless otherwise noted, results are from these
two waves. We then compare results from the second and third waves, in which subjects
played the same two games (DDG and BG) but with different enforceable minimum actions
(i.e. different levels of enforceability). Finally, we compare results from the second and fourth
waves, in which subjects played the same two games (DDG and BG) but under different
contracting rules to investigate the structure of contracting on behavior.
4.1 Contracting
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
Table 1 reports the fraction of subjects who requested each kind of contract in each of
the four games across all periods. It also reports the fraction of subjects who requested all
three contracts and the fraction who requested none. The vast majority of subjects (at least
80% for every contract in every game) asked for each of the contracts, and subjects generally
asked for all three of the contracts (at least 70% did this in every game). Even though the
Handshake contract had no effect on action spaces, it was just as appealing to subjects as
the enforceable contracts. Additionally, there were no notable trends across periods in the
aggregate usage of the contracts (although we will highlight in a later section an interesting
trend for a subset of subjects).
4.2 Effectiveness of a Handshake
The reason behind the popularity of the Handshake contract is readily apparent: handshake
agreements are remarkably effective at raising actions towards the socially optimal action.
The most efficient contract always includes a handshake; a handshake always increases actions
relative to the corresponding no-handshake contract; and, when compared to contracts with
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relatively weak enforceable restrictions in the first two waves of sessions, the Handshake
contract was weakly or strictly optimal for three of the four games.
4.2.1 Average Actions
Figure 1 displays the average action (conditional on the contract) of subjects who asked for
all three contracts in a given round (and who had the contract in those rounds). While we
restrict attention to subjects who requested all three contracts in order to rule out differences
due to selection effects, the results are essentially the same if we include all subjects or only
subjects who asked for all three contracts in every round.20 For comparability across the
games, we scale the actions into percentages so that 0% denotes the selfish equilibrium action
(5 in the APG, 0 in the other three games) while 100% denotes the socially optimal (first best)
action (10 in the APG and DDG, 6 in the MPG, and 100 in the BG). The figure displays the
average action for each contract as well as for the condition where no contract was possible.
The horizontal bar denotes the enforceable minimum action for each game.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
Introducing a handshake agreement to a contract substantially increases the efficiency of
actions. The Handshake contract increases actions by 30% to 90% over No Contract. The
Combined contract increases actions by 17% to 45% over the Minimum contract. These
differences are significant for all four games (a two-tailed t-test yields p < 0.01 for each of the
four games for both comparisons) and strongly support Hypothesis 1.
The Handshake contract also yields significantly higher actions than the Minimum con-
tract for the two games with strategic complements, the MPG and the BG (p < 0.01 for both
games), but not for the games with strategic independence (only directionally higher for the
DDG where p = 0.17 and directionally lower for the APG). This data supports Hypothesis 2
that the handshake agreements should be particularly strong in games with strategic comple-
ments. In games with strategic complements, even a selfish subject has a strategic incentive
to increase his action under a high induced norm (if he believes the other subject may be
norm sensitive or thinks the other subject believes he is norm sensitive). This result also
supports Hypothesis 3, in that the Minimum contract only leads to higher actions than the
Handshake in the APG, where average actions are quite low and the minimum is binding for
many subjects.
20Results are also essentially the same if we only include subjects who asked for all three contracts and whose
partner also asked for all three contracts in that round. Since subjects are only informed of their partner’s
contract suggestion for the contracting environment that is randomly selected, the partner’s contract choices
for the unavailable contracts should not (and do not) affect behavior.
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Once a contract includes the handshake agreement to play the first best, adding an en-
forceable minimum does not necessarily further increase subjects’ actions and can, in fact,
decrease them. While the Combined contract leads to significantly higher actions than the
Handshake contract in the APG (p < 0.01), the actions are not significantly different in the
MPG or DDG (p = 0.97 and 0.21, respectively) and actions are significantly lower under the
Combined contract in the BG (p = 0.04).
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
We confirm these results by regressing subjects’ actions on contract clause dummy vari-
ables as well as controls for time trends, treatment order, and game order within a session.21
The estimates, and the total difference between the Combined contract and the Handshake
contract, are presented in Table 2. We see that the presence of a handshake agreement in
the contract significantly increases actions in all four games; moreover, the effect is signifi-
cantly larger than the effect of an enforceable minimum for the MPG, DDG, and BG (Wald
test: p < 0.01 for each game).22 In the BG, introducing a minimum action has a marginally
significant negative effect. Lastly, the only significant differences between the Handshake
and Combined contracts are in the APG (where Combined is better) and in the BG (where
Handshake is better).
4.2.2 Time Trends
Having shown that the handshake agreements substantially increase actions on average, we
now want to examine their effects across rounds.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
Figure 2 presents the average action taken for No Contract and for the Handshake contract
for rounds 1 to 5 and rounds 6 to 10. The bars are stacked, so the light bar indicates
the average action as a percent of the social optimum under No Contract, and the dark
area denotes the increase in actions for the Handshake contract above the No Contract
baseline. To avoid selection problems, we again focus on subjects who requested all three
contracts.23 While the absolute level of the actions declines between the first and second
21We find quantitatively similar results using fixed effects. While we again focus on subjects who requested
all the contracts to avoid problems of selection, the results are the same if we include all observations or
instead look only at subjects who asked for all three contracts in every round.
22We also regressed, using only data from when the Handshake contract environment was randomly selected,
subjects’ actions on dummy variables for requesting the Handshake contract, the partner requesting the
Handshake contract, and an interaction term (for this specification we included all subjects). In all four
games, there is only a significant positive effect of the asking for a handshake agreement when both parties
requested it (so the handshake agreement was actually enacted).
23The results are the same if we look at all observations or if we look at only those subjects who request
all three contracts in every round.
11
half of the experiment for three of the four games, as is typical in public good games, the
difference between the Handshake contract and No Contract remains essentially the same for
all four games.24 Additionally, since the subjects play all four contracting environments in a
random sequence, the fact that even in later rounds the effect on actions occurs only when
the handshake agreement is actually present indicates that the contract itself is critical for
setting the norm, rather than merely causing some kind of coordination or demand effect that
could spread to the other contracting environments.
This result suggests that the effect of the handshake agreement in increasing actions is
stable over time. Even if parties learn to take lower actions over time, there may still be a
benefit to establishing an induced norm in the relationship.
4.2.3 Controlling for Guesses
One alternative hypothesis for why subjects’ actions change in response to the contract is
that the contract changes subjects’ beliefs about partner actions, which leads subjects to
alter their own actions (for strategic reasons or otherwise). If this were the case, subjects
might respond to contracts due to changes in beliefs, rather than internal desires to fulfill the
norm set by the contract.
To test this hypothesis, we also ask subjects to guess their partner’s action each round.
Agreeing to a Handshake contract (compared to no contract being available) has a similar,
but larger, effect on guesses than on actions. On average, subjects who request all three
contracts make higher guesses of partner actions under the Handshake contract than under
No Contract. For APG, they guess 63% under the Handshake contract and 26% under
No Contract; for MPG, 83% vs 62%; for DDG, 59% vs 27%; for BG, 86% vs 59%.25 Also,
average guesses are higher than realized actions: on average subjects are overoptimistic about
the actions of their partners. Nevertheless, the contract has a strong, significant effect beyond
the changes in beliefs. Table 3 presents the estimates of regressing a subject’s action (in the
Handshake contract) on a dummy for agreeing to the contract, as well as the subject’s guess
for his partner’s action.26
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
While subjects’ actions are significantly positively correlated with their beliefs about their
partners’ actions,27 there is also a separate effect from having the contract. If we compare
24We find similar results comparing the Combined and Minimum contracts in each half.
25All four differences are significant, with p < 0.01 for each game.
26For this analysis we include all subjects from the first two waves of sessions in order to increase the
number of observations.
27As one would expect, the coefficient is larger for the games with strategic complements where subjects
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the direct effect of the contract to the indirect effect from the change in the subject’s guess,
the direct effect accounts for roughly 30% to 40% of the total effect on actions.
We can also directly compare a subject’s action to his guess. In particular, in the MPG
and the BG, a subject’s guess uniquely defines a selfish best response (if subjects have point
beliefs rather than belief distributions). In both games, we observe a substantial number
of subjects taking actions strictly larger than their selfish best response, indicating non-
strategic motivation to take a high action, as is predicted by our model of contracts inducing
norms. In the MPG, 61% of actions are strictly larger than the best response under both the
Handshake contract and the Combined contract, 55% of subjects chose an action higher than
their best response in the No Contract condition, and 50% chose a higher action under the
Minimum contract. In the BG, 29% of actions are strictly larger than the best response for
the Handshake contract, 31% for the Combined contract, 30% for No Contract, and 38% for
the Minimum contract.
In all four games, many subjects take actions strictly larger than their guess of partner’s
actions. Under the Handshake contract, 15% of subject actions in the APG are strictly larger
than the corresponding guess of the other subjects’ action.28 Similarly, 40% of actions in the
MPG, 14% of actions in the DDG, and 24% of actions in the BG are strictly larger than
the subject’s guess. This result is particularly striking for the BG, since if these subjects’
reported beliefs are accurate, they expect a modal outcome in which they receive a payoff of
zero. We also observe a similar number of actions that are larger than corresponding guesses
under the Combined contract (7% in the APG, 21% in the MPG, 14% in the DDG, and 19%
in the BG).
4.3 The Role of Norms
Having demonstrated that the handshake agreement substantially increases the efficiency of
subjects’ actions, we now look for further evidence that the handshake agreement is changing
behavior by setting a norm, rather than some other effect. In particular, we look for evidence
that subjects experience disutility from taking actions that deviate from the induced norm
set by the handshake agreement.
While we noted previously that the fraction of subjects asking for each contract is stable
throughout the experiment, in each game there are a substantial number of subjects who
dramatically decrease their usage of the Handshake contract between the first half and second
have a pecuniary incentive to increase actions as partner actions increase.
28To avoid ceiling effects we exclude cases where the subject guessed that his partner would take the largest
individually rational action. For example, if a subject guesses that his partner will take action 10 in the DDG,
it is not possible to take a strictly higher action.
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half of the experiment.29 Table 4 displays the number of these subjects in each game, their
average payoff in the second half with and without the Handshake contract, as well as the
average payoff of other subjects with the Handshake contract.
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
Between 9% and 20% of subjects decrease usage of the Handshake contract in each game,
decreasing their frequency of requesting the contract between 34% and 54%. However, these
subjects are still requesting the Handshake contract in one fifth to one half the periods;
consequently, we can compare the average payoff of this group in periods when they do not
have the contract to periods when they do.30 If we compare the average payoff of these subjects
in periods without the contract to periods with the contract, we see that without the contract
subjects earn substantially less: between $0.93 and $4.64 less each round. These subjects
could increase their monetary earnings simply by requesting the contract more often and
playing the same strategy. Similarly, if we compare the “decreased usage” subjects’ average
payoff without the contract to the average payoff of the other subjects with the contract,
the “decreased usage” subjects’ payoff is again substantially lower: they earn between $1.48
and $2.89 less each round. Because there are relatively few observations, in order to test the
difference statistically, we convert the earnings within each game to z-scores (so that they will
be comparable across games) and pool across games. Among the pooled data, the earnings for
“decreased usage” subjects without the Handshake contract are significantly lower than with
the Handshake contract (p = 0.04) and significantly lower than earnings for other subjects
with the Handshake contact (p < 0.01).31 Thus, these subjects are making a large monetary
sacrifice by not requesting the contract. Since having the contract will on average increase
the action of the other subject, and because no matter what action an individual intends to
take he will receive a higher payoff when the other subject increases her action, there must
be something about agreeing to the contract itself that these subjects dislike.32
We suspect that the subjects stopped using the Handshake contract because they knew
29The fraction asking for each contract is the same because other subjects increase their usage.
30Since these subjects are requesting the contract much less often than the other subjects, it is almost
always the case that they do not have the contract because they rejected it.
31We obtain similar results from a regression with subject random effects and game dummies.
32It is unlikely that the contract choices were mistakes due to incorrect learning. In the first half of the
experiment “decreased usage” subjects also earned lower payoffs without the Handshake contract than with
it (p = 0.01). Moreover, the “decreased usage” subjects did not have less accurate beliefs about the actions
of their partners than the other subjects. More specifically, in the second half of the experiment, the average
difference between subjects’ guesses and the actual action of their partner was not significantly different
between the “decreased usage” subjects and the other subjects, either overall in the Handshake condition or
specifically for cases without the contract (p > 0.10 in both cases). To compare across games, we apply the
same transformation to guesses as we do to actions so that any differences represent errors in subjects’ beliefs.
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they were not going to fulfill it. In all four games, the subjects who decreased usage of the
Handshake contract were on average taking higher actions than their partners in the first
half of the experiment. The average difference of a decreased usage subject’s action and
his partner’s action under the Handshake contract (i.e. own action - partner action) was:
APG, 0.91; MPG, 1.17; DDG, 1.85; BG, 3.95.33 Moreover, recall that in all the games except
the MPG, average actions decline over time; this observation is also true for decreased usage
subjects. Hence, both the general unraveling over time and the lower actions of their partners
pushed these subjects to decrease their average actions under the Handshake contract and
thus further increase the gap between their agreement to play the first best and their actual
action. The substantial decrease in the frequency of requesting the Handshake contract
(despite its monetary benefits), a reluctance to make agreements from which they would
ultimately deviate, is consistent with subjects experiencing disutility for violating the induced
norm established by the handshake agreement.
4.4 30% Minimum Condition (Wave 3)
Comparing across games, the Handshake contract is more effective when the enforceable
minimum is low relative to the average action when no contract is available. To further
investigate the role of the enforceable minimum, we ran a third wave of experimental sessions
that replicated the design and procedures for the second wave of sessions (the DDG and BG
games) but set the enforceable minimum for the Minimum and Combined contracts at 30%
of the first best (i.e. the minimum actions were 3 and 30, respectively). This allows us to
test whether our results are robust to different levels of the enforceable minimum action.
Demand for the contracts was quite similar in both the DDG and the BG to the 10%
minimum condition.34 Figure 3 presents the average action taken (again scaled so that 0%
is the selfish equilibrium action and 100% is the first best) for both the second wave at 10%
and the third wave at 30%.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
In both games, we again find that the optimal contract includes a handshake agreement.
In the DDG, the overall pattern is quite similar, although (unsurprisingly) the Minimum
and Combined contracts yield higher actions with the higher minimum.35 These results lend
33Within each game we construct z-scores for the difference. Pooling across games, the average standardized
difference of the decreased usage subjects is significantly different from zero (two-tailed t-test, p = 0.04).
34In the DDG: Minimum contract, 88%; Handshake contract, 90%; Combined contract, 92%; and All, 79%.
In the BG: Minimum contract, 84%; Handshake contract, 88%; Combined contract, 87%; and All, 76%.
35All three contracts yield significantly higher actions than No Contract (two-tailed t-test: p < 0.01 for all
three contracts). The Minimum contract and Handshake contract are not significantly different (p > 0.90),
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more support for Hypothesis 3. If we compare the pattern of actions in the 30% DDG to
the APG, another game with strategic independence where the minimum action is also larger
than the average action under No Contract, we see that in both the 30% DDG and the APG,
the Minimum and Handshake contracts yield approximately equal actions and the Combined
contract is superior to both. Thus it is quite clear that the minimum is particularly effective
when the enforceable minimum is high compared to the action under No Contract. On
the other hand, in the BG, the relationships between the contracts in the 30% condition is
essentially the same as in the 10% condition.36
Thus it seems that allowing for more complete contracts does not affect the efficiency of
the Handshake contract in either game, increases somewhat the efficiency of the Minimum
and Combined contracts in the DDG, and has either no effect or a negative effect on those
contracts in the BG.37 We find the same results using regression analysis.38
These findings suggest that our results are robust to moderate increases in the strength of
the enforceability of contracts. Handshake agreements continue to have a substantial effect on
behavior, increasing efficiency significantly. While the higher minimum increases actions when
the minimum binds often (as in the 30% DDG), it has little effect when the minimum is still
largely slack (as in the 30% BG). Even when the minimum binds often, it still has a comparable
effect on behavior as the handshake agreement alone, and the handshake agreement still
appears to contribute substantially to the effectiveness of the Combined contract.
4.5 Unilateral Contracting (Wave 4)
We also conducted an additional experiment to explore the role of bilateral contracting in
the relative performance of the Handshake and Combined contracts. In previous experiments
in the “hidden cost of control” literature (see Falk and Kosfeld 2006) and the “crowding
out” literature (see Gneezy and Rustichini 2000), prosocial behavior can be damaged by the
and the Combined contract leads to significantly higher actions than both the Minimum and Handshake
contracts (p = 0.03 and p = 0.06 respectively). Between the 10% and 30% minimum conditions, actions
are not significantly different under No Contract or the Handshake contract (p > 0.40 for both treatments),
while actions are significantly higher under the Minimum contract (p < 0.01), and are marginally significantly
higher under the Combined contract (p = 0.06).
36The Minimum contract is not significantly different from No Contract (p > 0.20), the Combined contract
leads to significantly higher actions than both No Contract and the Minimum contract (p < 0.01 in both cases),
and the Handshake contract induces significantly higher actions than all three other contracts (p < 0.01 in
all three cases).
37In the BG, actions under the Combined contract are somewhat lower in the 30% condition than in the
10% condition. The difference for the Combined contract is statistically significant (p < 0.01) while the
other three contracting environments do not differ significantly (No Contract: p > 0.30, Minimum contract:
p > 0.30, and Handshake contract: p > 0.16).
38The regression analysis is available on request from the authors.
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addition of enforceable controls or fines. While the contexts considered in those experiments
are different (in many respects) from the context here, if the overall intuition extended to
our setting we might expect that the Combined contract would perform less well than the
Handshake contract due to the addition of an enforceable restriction. However, the results we
have analyzed so far indicate that adding an enforceable restriction to a Handshake contract
was only harmful in one of the games we studied, the Bertrand Game. In contrast, in the
APG and the 30% DDG, adding enforceability improves performance.
One of the major differences between our design and those of the previous literature is
that in the games we have analyzed thus far, the contracting environment is symmetric. One
main intuition of the “hidden cost” literature is that subjects respond negatively to being
distrusted, and settings in which both parties have agreed to a restriction might not generate
a feeling of distrust. This intuition suggests that the hidden cost results may arise in our
setting if the contract were set unilaterally rather than bilaterally.
Our setting is also symmetric in the effects of the contract (a minimum action affects
both subjects). In the “hidden cost of control” literature, control is imposed unilaterally by
the principal and affects only the agent. In the unilateral contracting environment we now
consider, we preserve this symmetric restriction of the contract on subject actions, but allow
control to be imposed unilaterally. Consequently, this analysis will allow us to investigate the
effect of unilaterally imposing control on prosocial motivations in our symmetric setting. It
will also allow us to see whether our results are robust to a change in contracting rules.
We ran a fourth wave of experimental sessions that replicated the design and procedures
for the second wave of sessions (the DDG and BG games with the minimum at 10%) but in
which the contracting environment was unilateral. One subject was randomly selected at the
start of the round to set the contract for the pair of actors.
Demand for the contracts was again quite similar in both the DDG and the BG to demand
for contracts under the symmetric contracting rule.39 Figure 4 presents the average action
taken (again scaled so that 0% is the selfish equilibrium action and 100% is the first best)
in the fourth wave with unilateral contracting for the subjects choosing the contract in that
round (the first and third sets of bars), and the subject not choosing the contract (the second
and fourth sets of bars). Since we do not observe contract choices for every subject in every
period, we use a slightly different restriction: we look at subjects who asked for all three
contracts in at least one period.
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE]
39In the DDG: Minimum contract, 77%; Handshake contract, 84%; Combined contract, 82%; and All, 67%.
In the BG: Minimum contract, 82%; Handshake contract, 89%; Combined contract, 85%; and All, 76%.
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Overall, the actions under each contract are very similar between subjects who choose
the contract and those who do not. As in our previous experimental waves, we find that
contracts that include a handshake agreement (the Handshake and Combined contracts) lead
to a substantial increase in the action taken, both by the subject who chose to make the
handshake agreement and by the other subject who merely sees the contract choice.40 Thus
the statement “we agree” to take the first best action, chosen by only one subject, increases
the actions of both subjects. Unlike our previous results, however, we do not find evidence
for a negative effect in the Bertrand Game of imposing a minimum action (compared to the
corresponding contract without a minimum).41
Table 5 presents the estimates from regressing subject actions on contract dummies (and
additional controls) for all subjects who choose all three contracts in at least one period,
as well as for the contract choosers and non-choosers separately. Contract choosers take
somewhat higher actions than non-choosers across all the contracts in both games. In both
games, handshake agreements increase the actions of both contract choosers and non-choosers
by similar amounts. As is visible in Figure 4, there is less of a crowding out effect from
combining a handshake agreement with a minimum action under unilateral contracting than
under symmetric contracting—the Combined contract does not lead to significantly lower
actions than the Handshake contract in the BG. Therefore, the differences between our results
and the “hidden cost” and “crowding out” literatures cannot be due to unilateral contracting.
Instead, one of the other differences in the design, for example the symmetric actions or
symmetric payoffs, may lead to the differences in our results.
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
5 Discussion
Following the intuition laid out in Section 3, our experimental results suggest that an in-
duced norm can be established through a simple contract and that such a norm can have
a significant impact on behavior. Confirming our main prediction (Hypothesis 1), subjects
take significantly more prosocial actions when they have made a handshake agreement as
part of the contracting process. These results support our intuition that setting norms is an
40Actions in the DDG under the Handshake and Combined contracts are significantly higher than under the
No Contract and Minimum contract conditions respectively for contract choosers (two-tailed t-test: p = 0.03
and p < 0.01 respectively) and for non-choosers (p = 0.06, p < 0.01). Similarly, actions in the Bertrand Game
are significantly higher for both groups under the Handshake and Combined contracts (p < 0.01 for all cases).
41While actions under the Minimum contract are directionally lower than in the No Contract case for both
groups, the differences are not significant (p = 0.13, p > 0.40). Similarly, actions under the Combined contract
are directionally lower than under the Handshake contract, but the difference is not significant (p > 0.40 in
both cases).
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important part of the efficacy of incomplete contracts.
Furthermore, in our experiment it appears that the major benefit of the Combined con-
tract came from its ability to set a high norm. Taking the estimates from Table 2 (and
corresponding analysis from the 30% minimum games), we can measure the percentage ben-
efit of the Combined contract that is generated by the handshake agreement alone.42 The
handshake agreement contributes between 51% and 173% of the efficiency increase of the
Combined contract, with the smallest effect in the APG and the largest effect in the 10% and
30% BG.43 Thus, merely establishing the norm through the handshake agreement is sufficient
to generate most (or all) of the effect of the Combined contract. It may be that much of
the benefit of simple real-world contracts comes from their role in establishing high norms,
compared to the effect of their weak enforceable restrictions.44 In addition, our results suggest
that when there are contracting costs to add enforceable restrictions to a contract, fairly in-
complete contracts may be attractive, since such contracts achieve similar levels of efficiency
without the costs of enforceability. Similarly, Scott (2003) argues in a legal context that
incomplete, legally unenforceable contracts are useful because agents respond to “reciprocal
fairness,” which can make unenforceable contracts self-enforcing.
Our results are consistent with several of our other behavioral predictions. Violating the
norm appears to generates negative utility, since 10% to 20% of subjects forego material
payoff by not asking for the Handshake contract. As predicted in Hypothesis 2, the hand-
shake agreement was particularly effective in the two games with strategic complements (the
MPG and BG). Similarly, the Minimum contract was most effective in the APG, where the
average action under No Contract was quite low and many subjects were acting below the
minimum when no contract was allowed. The minimum was least effective in the BG, where
the actions without a contract were particularly high relative to the minimum action and few
subjects were acting below the minimum. When we directly increased the minimum, both the
Minimum and the Combined contract became relatively more effective in the DDG. In the
BG, increasing the minimum did not effect the Minimum contract and made the Combined
contract less effective. This result contrasts somewhat with the assumptions underlying Hy-
42We divide the estimated coefficient from the handshake agreement by the estimated total effect of the
Combined contract to construct an upper bound on the percentage of the effect coming from the handshake.
For a lower bound, we add the coefficient on the interaction effect to the numerator (i.e. subtracting out all
of the substitutability).
43Percentages greater than 100% indicate cases where the Handshake contract is more efficient than the
Combined contract.
44We find strong results using structured contractual statements. In the business settings, where commu-
nication is free form, the effect may be stronger. For example, Charness and Dufwenberg (2007) find that
structured communication fails to change beliefs and actions in their trust game where free form communi-
cation is more effective.
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pothesis 3 that the only effect of an enforceable minimum is to increase the actions of subjects
contributing below the minimum—we discuss this further in section 5.2 below.
5.1 Alternative Explanations
We have demonstrated that handshake agreements have a substantial effect on actions, con-
sistent with our intuition that contracts establish induced norms that influence behavior. We
also observe that alternative theories of behavior cannot explain our data. In addition to the
specific reasons given below, all of the alternative explanations discussed in this section fail
because: (a) they do not depend on the content of the contract and therefore cannot explain
different contracts generating different outcomes; and (b) they assume that contractual con-
tent does not affect utility and thus cannot explain why certain subjects choose to stop using
the Handshake contract when the handshake agreement increases the average action taken
by the other player and thus private earnings.
Purely rational coordination among selfish individuals cannot explain our results, since all
of the games we study have a unique equilibrium (or a small set of equilibria, with very low
actions, in the case of the BG), and so there is no room for coordination to change actions
in equilibrium. Additionally, subjects cannot use the contracts to signal altruism since the
Handshake contract can be established with zero cost, and therefore there is no equilibrium
that separates altruists and selfish types, only a single pooling equilibrium. Subjects cannot
use the contracts to signal that they are conditional cooperators. Again, if there are multiple
types, there is no separating equilibrium, as every subject will want to signal that they
will play a high action in order to increase the action of their partner. This single pooling
equilibrium cannot have actions above the selfish equilibrium.45
5.2 Crowding Out Effects
The literatures on the “hidden costs of control” (e.g. Falk and Kosfeld 2006) and the “crowd-
ing out” of intrinsic motivation (e.g. Gneezy and Rustichini 2000a,b) have shown that impos-
ing incentives (like fines) or other forms of control can significantly undermine individuals’
prosociality. More generally, one might imagine that setting multiple reference actions, such
as an enforceable minimum action and the first best action, could create confusion in what the
norm is, providing two focal actions to coordinate on, or otherwise bias the norm.46 However,
45In addition, conditional cooperators would not take actions strictly above their guess of their partner’s
action. A pure conditional cooperator wants to take the exact same action as his guess, and any self-interested
monetary motivations would lead to lower actions. Thus, this theory could not explain our observation that
a substantial number of subjects take an action larger than their stated belief.
46For example, the literature on anchoring (see Kahneman et al 1999 for a survey) has shown that even
obviously arbitrary reference values can bias subjects’ construction of estimates or expectations. In particular,
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we find only weak evidence of crowding out in our (rather different) setting.
There are a number of reasons why our results might differ from those found in the hidden
cost literature. First, the Falk and Kosfeld (2006) “hidden costs” paradigm is a principal-
agent setting in which control is imposed unilaterally by the principal; we focus primarily on
control being imposed bilaterally (i.e. by both agents agreeing to the contract). We address
this difference directly in the experiment and find that symmetric contracting is not leading
to difference in results across the paradigms. Second, in the the hidden costs paradigm, the
impact of the control is only imposed on the agent; our setting has symmetry in the imposition
of control such that both agents are restricted by the contract. Third, in the hidden costs
paradigm only the agent chooses an action after control has been implemented; in our setting
payoffs are symmetric in the actions of the two agents.
As noted above, we manipulate the contracting rules in our experiment to investigate the
effect of contracting being unilateral rather than bilateral. We find that our results look very
similar across unilateral and bilateral contracting. In particular, we do not see results that
are more consistent with the hidden costs literature under unilateral contracting; instead, we
see somewhat less crowding out. In the unilateral contracting sessions of Wave 4, handshake
agreements are beneficial, but enforced minimum actions do not lead to crowding out in
the Bertrand Game. Unilateral contracting is neither necessary nor sufficient for enforceable
minimums to undercut the power of an induced norm.
Consequently, it is more likely that the differences between our results and the results of
the hidden costs literature is caused by the difference in which individuals are affected by
the contractual terms. Specifically, in our setting both players have symmetric roles in the
game, and any contractual restriction affects both players equally (rather than restricting the
action of only one player). This mutuality of control may be the reason we find much less
crowding out in our data. An interesting direction for future research is to directly compare
contractual settings with equal and unequal performance obligations to further identify the
role of unequal obligations on agents’ prosocial behavior.
Furthermore, an additional characteristic that is different from the mechanisms in the
“crowding out” and “hidden cost” literatures may help explain crowding out in our Bertrand
Game. In the Bertrand Game, coordination among the two subjects’ actions is more impor-
tant than in the three other games, since failure to coordinate leads one subject to earn a
payoff of zero. The introduction of the minimum in the Bertrand Game may lead to lower
actions because it provides an alternate and relatively “safe” focal action at the minimum.
Robbennoltt and Studebaker (1999) show experimentally that (generally non-binding) limits on punitive
damages lead to a significant increase in both punitive and compensatory damages.
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The minimum action provides a payoff of at least half the minimum and is an action on which
subjects can more easily coordinate since it is the unique selfish equilibrium of the game when
a restriction in place. Alternatively, if a subject attempts to coordinate on the first best, he
will receive a payoff of zero whenever his partner chooses an action that is not the first best.
We see direct evidence of subjects gravitating towards the minimum when it is available:
only 0.83% of subjects with a Handshake contract choose an action of 10 or less, compared
to 5.24% who choose 10 under the Combined contract (for the Combined contract we look
at 10 alone since subjects cannot choose less than 10; test of proportions: p < 0.01). While
the focality of the minimum makes it a much more common choice, we also see a significant
increase in the fraction of other low actions in the Combined contract: 7.50% of subjects with
a Handshake contract choose and action between 11 and 40, compared to 13.33% of subjects
with a Combined contract (p = 0.04). This result suggests that such a coordination mecha-
nism does push actions to the minimum and can explain part of the crowding out in the BG,
but it cannot explain all of the crowding out. This kind of coordination mechanism should
also matter in the unilateral setting of Wave 4. Indeed, we find a similar jump in actions
10 or less from 3.13% with a Handshake contract to 8.33% with a Combined contract, even
though in the unilateral setting we do not find an overall crowding out effect when comparing
those two contracts.
In attempting to identify a crowding out effect, we want to make sure we are not mispec-
ifying the nature of crowding out. Up to now, we have identified crowding out by comparing
the actions under the Handshake contract to actions under the Combined contract (or by
comparing actions under no contact to actions with the Minimum contract). Some previ-
ous studies have found that the imposition of extrinsic incentives can continue to undermine
intrinsic motivation even after the removal of the incentives (see, for example, Gneezy and
Rustichini 2000b; see Deci et al. 1999 for a survey). If this kind of intertemporal crowding out
were to occur in our experiment, then subjects who had even once experienced a contract with
a minimum might take lower actions in all future periods with a handshake. This could mean
that while we do not observe crowding out when comparing the handshake to the combined
contract, crowding out could simply cause actions to be lower under the Handshake contract
than they would have been if subjects had never been exposed to an enforceable minimum.
While this alternative type of crowding out could be at play in our experiment, we do not find
evidence of it in our data. First, we replicate our crowding out results in the for Handshake
and Combined contracts when looking only at subjects who had not previously experienced
a contract with a minimum. Again, we find no significant difference between the Handshake
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and Combined contracts in the APG, MPG or DDG (Ranksum: p = 0.34, p = 0.75 and
p = 0.31 respectively) while there is a significant difference in the BG (p = 0.02). Second,
if we replicate the analysis of Table 2 with an additional control for the number of previous
periods the subject had a contract with a minimum, our results are similar and the control
for the number of previous contracts with a minimum is never significant. More exposure to
minimum contacts does not generate lower actions in our data.47 We take these two results
as evidence that there is not intertemporal crowding out in our experiment.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we argue that contracts establish induced norms for a relationship and that in-
complete contracts can substantially affect behavior by setting such norms. In our experiment,
the optimal contract always includes an unenforceable handshake agreement. Contracts with
handshake agreements lead to substantially higher actions than the corresponding contracts
without handshakes, with the greatest difference observed in games with strategic comple-
ments. In many games, a contract consisting of only an unenforceable handshake agreement
is (weakly) optimal. Similarly, when a contract contains both an enforceable restriction and
an unenforceable handshake agreement, the majority of the effect on behavior comes from
the handshake. Our results are best explained by a model in which contracts establish norms
and individuals experience disutility for taking actions that deviate from such norms.
These results suggest why incomplete contracts might be so prevalent in many settings.
If incomplete contracts can set high norms that increase efficiency, and if adding enforceable
components is costly and does not generate much additional benefit, contracts may be left
intentionally simple and substantially incomplete.
Having demonstrated the important role of norms and contracts in these simple games, our
results could be developed and extended along several dimensions in future research. In our
experiment, the contracts were presented with the minimum and the handshake agreements
fixed and subjects were only able to accept or reject the whole contract. Future experiments
could allow subjects to directly negotiate each of these clauses. It would be quite interesting
to see whether the benefit of the handshake agreement would be enhanced or diminished when
subjects can set the exact unenforceable agreement. In addition, we restricted our attention
to single dimensional action spaces and consequently to one simple handshake agreement.
Many economic interactions are multi-dimensional; and it may be interesting to examine the
optimal mix of enforceable and unenforceable clauses in the contract. In particular, if there
47Furthermore, if we add an interaction between the handshake agreement and the number of previous
periods with a minimum, we find that it is not significant in any of the games.
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are limitations on how many unenforceable agreements an individual will feel beholden to
follow (if too many handshake agreements dilute their influence), then it may be optimal to
focus on establishing a norm for the most important dimensions of the relationship and rely
on enforceable components of the contract for the others.
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Table 1: Contract Choices
% Request the Contract APG MPG DDG BG
Minimum 80.51% 82.56% 87.00% 81.88%
Handshake 80.13% 88.33% 87.75% 86.38%
Combined 81.54% 85.38% 86.88% 84.75%
Request All 71.67% 77.69% 79.63% 74.63%
Request None 10.64% 7.18% 5.63% 7.63%










APG MPG DDG BG
No Contract Handshake Minimum Combined
Actions scaled so that 0% denotes the selfish optimum action and 100% denotes the first best action. Only
subjects who requested all contracts are included. Horizontal bar denotes the minimum action required by
the Minimum/Combined contracts.
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Table 2: Effect of Contracts on Actions
APG MPG DDG BG
Coefficients (1) (2) (3) (4)
Partner Rejected Contract -0.00687 -0.257 -0.693** -3.497
(0.17) (0.22) (0.29) (2.84)
Contract w/ Minimum 0.762*** 0.379** 0.675** -4.545*
(0.16) (0.17) (0.27) (2.36)
Contract w/ Handshake 0.892*** 1.292*** 1.571*** 26.94***
(0.20) (0.16) (0.28) (2.13)
(w/ Minimum) x (w/ Handshake) -0.0899 -0.417** -0.219 -0.478
(0.25) (0.21) (0.40) (3.16)
Constant 6.764*** 3.087*** 3.189*** 58.08***
(0.29) (0.33) (0.53) (3.65)
Period Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Session Order Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 559 606 793 732
Number of Subjects 73 69 95 95
* Total Difference [Combined - Handshake] 0.672*** -0.0374 0.456 -5.024**
(0.19) (0.12) (0.29) (2.12)
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Significance is denoted: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.
The specification includes subject random effects, and the observations are restricted to periods where the
subject requests all contracts. The omitted category is the No Contract environment where no contract was
available.
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1st Half 2nd Half 1st Half 2nd Half 1st Half 2nd Half 1st Half 2nd Half
APG MPG DDG BG
No Contract Handshake
Actions scaled so that 0% denotes the selfish optimum action and 100% denotes the first best action. Only
subjects who requested all contracts are included. The dark portion of the bar indicates the additional
increase in the average action for the Handshake contract compared to the No Contract environment.
Table 3: Effect of Handshake Contract and Guesses on Actions
APG MPG DDG BG
Coefficients (1) (2) (3) (4)
Handshake Contract 0.235 0.663*** 0.841* 9.403***
(0.23) (0.25) (0.45) (2.95)
Guess of Partner’s Action 0.308*** 0.672*** 0.302*** 0.547***
(0.061) (0.059) (0.062) (0.066)
Constant 4.447*** 0.636** 1.821*** 29.83***
(0.65) (0.32) (0.70) (6.41)
Period Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Session Order Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 234 234 306 306
Number of Subjects 78 78 102 102
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Significance is denoted: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.
The specification includes subject random effects, and the observations are restricted to periods where the
Handshake contract was available.
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Table 4: Subjects Who Decrease Usage of the Handshake Contract
# of Subjects Pr. Request Subjects’ Payoff Other Subj.
Decreasing Contract (2nd Half) (2nd Half)
Usage (1st/2nd Half) w/o Contr. w/ Contr. w/ Contr.
APG 13 of 78 65% / 23% 22.06 53.00 29.44
MPG 7 of 78 74% / 20% 21.86 34.33 41.15
DDG 20 of 102 88% / 54% 20.50 26.71 30.42
BG 16 of 102 75% / 40% 16.13 25.20 27.20
Figure 3: Subjects’ Actions: 10% Minimum versus 30% Minimum
Actions scaled so that 0% denotes the selfish optimum action and 100% denotes the first best action. Only
subjects who requested all contracts are included. Horizontal bar denotes the minimum action required by
the Minimum/Combined contracts.
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Figure 4: Subjects’ Actions: Unilateral Contracting Treatments
Actions scaled so that 0% denotes the selfish optimum action and 100% denotes the first best action. Only
subjects who requested all contracts in at least one period are included. Horizontal bar denotes the
minimum action required by the Minimum/Combined contracts.
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Table 5: Effect of Contracts on Actions: Unilateral Contracting
DDG DDG DDG BG BG BG
Non- Non-
All Chooser Chooser All Chooser Chooser
Coefficients (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reject Contract 0.0502 -0.176 0.0667 -6.153* -7.043 -8.050
(0.376) (0.628) (0.536) (3.493) (5.308) (4.965)
Contract w/ Minimum 0.595* 1.087** -0.113 -4.482 -5.863 -3.447
(0.308) (0.465) (0.499) (2.763) (4.134) (4.355)
Contract w/ Handshake 1.703*** 1.670*** 1.501*** 23.82*** 25.39*** 22.38***
(0.349) (0.503) (0.539) (2.628) (3.658) (4.204)
(w/ Minimum) x (w/ Handshake) 0.0423 -0.425 0.884 1.849 2.983 1.870
(0.467) (0.689) (0.712) (3.816) (5.522) (6.013)
Constant 3.912*** 4.406*** 3.481*** 54.74*** 61.76*** 48.96***
(0.672) (0.772) (0.757) (4.597) (5.275) (5.659)
Period Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Session Order Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 540 274 266 580 296 284
Number of Subjects 54 54 54 58 58 58
* Total Difference 0.637* 0.662 0.771 -2.633 -2.880 -1.577
[Combined - Handshake] (0.35) (0.51) (0.51) (2.61) (3.61) (4.06)
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Significance is denoted: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.
The specification includes subject random effects, and the observations are restricted to subjects who request
all contracts in at least one period. The omitted category is the No Contract environment where no contract
was available.
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